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COMMENTS
APPEAL AND ERROR - BAD FAITH OF COUNSEL AS A BASIS FOR
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL WHERE FACT THAT DEFENDANT WAS INSURED WAs BROUGHT TO ATTENTION oF JuRY - It is generally
agreed that the jury in a personal injury action should not be informed
that the defendant is covered by indemnity insurance.1 The reasons for
1 56 A. L. R. 1418 (1928); 74 A. L. R. 849 (1931); 95 A. L. R. 388 (1935);
105 A. L. R. 1319 (1936).

COMMENTS

the rule are that the matter of insurance is irrelevant,2 and that the
exposition of its existence is prejudicial. The jury is likely to grant
more and larger verdicts for the plaintiff when it is known that an
insurance company, rather than the individual defendant being tried,
will have to pay the judgment. 8 However, the fact that the defendant
is insured reaches the jury in a multitude of ways. While direct evidence of insurance is inadmissible as such, it may be introduced if it
bears on· some material issue.4 Also, the jury is quick to realize that an
insurance company is involved when, upon the voir dire examination,
each prospective juror is questioned as to his and his family's interest in
any insurance company. Often the matter comes in inadvertently, as
where the witness' answer mentioning insurance is unresponsive to the
question asked. Finally it may be brought to the jury's attention through
the wilful misconduct of counsel. In those exceptional situations where
evidence of insurance is admissible 5 the introduction of such evidence
clearly does not constitute error, but when the matter of insurance is
clearly inadmissible, and yet the matter does get before the jury, many
courts will grant the defendant a new trial if the opposing counsel
acted wilfully, and will deny a new trial if opposing counsel acted in
good faith. This comment is addressed to this distinction.
I.

The jury most frequently becomes aware of the defendant's insurance when the jurors are questioned on their voir dire as to their possible connection. with insurance companies. From this line of questioning they are quick to infer that an insurance company is in the case,
especially if they are questioned as to connections with a specifically
named company. Strong policy arguments are advanced both for and
against permitting plaintiff's counsel to pursue this line of examination.
The plaintiff is entitled to an impartial jury free from members who
are financially interested in the outcome of the cause. It is argued that
to secure to the plaintiff this fundamental right it is necessary that
he be allowed to question jurors as to their possible connection with
insurance companies so that he can challenge for cause, or at least have
8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA oF INSURANCE LAw, § 2254 (1931).
2 W1GMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., § 282a (1940).
¼ See citations in note 1, supra.
5 Evidence of insurance is admissible relative to the relationship creating liability:
Paepke v. Stadelman, 222 Mo. App. 346, 300 S. W. 845 (1927); Davis v. North
Carolina Shipbuilding Co., 180 N. C. 74, 104 S. E. 82 (1920); 56 A. L. R. 1418
at 1433 (1928). To show bias of witness: Di Tommaso v. Syracuse University, 218
N. Y. 640, l 12 N. E. 1057 (1916); Lenahan v. Pittson Coal Mining Co., 221 Pa.
626, 70 A. 884 (1908). To show admission of defendant, 95 A. L. R. 388 at 398
(1935).
2
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a basis for the intelligent exercise of his right to peremptory challenge,
and thus rid the jury of all those jurors who would be partial because
of connections with insurance companies. 0 However, the defendant is
also entitled to an impartial jury, and to a trial upon the issues of the
case as well. It is clear that once the matter of insurance is injected into
the case he receives neither. With such a conflict of policy it is not surprising to find a corresponding conflict among the courts, the decisions
ranging from those holding that it is reversible error to mention insurance on the voir dire 7 to those at the other extreme which hold it reversible error to refuse to permit the inquiry. 8 The middle ground is
occupied by courts which allow the questions if asked in good faith,
but disallow them otherwise.9 In jurisdictions applying the "good faith
rule" the basic requisite seems to be that the questions be asked to gain
information of the jurors' qualifications rather than to inform the jury
of the defendant's insurance. 10 Obviously such a test will often be difficult to apply, for frequently it will be almost impossible to demonstrate
counsel's lack of good faith, 11 with the result that the voir dire will
afford a means of placing inadmissible and prejudicial matter before the
Jury.
Aside from the difficulties of administering a good faith rule, there
is still the question whether the intent of plaintiff's counsel should influence the result. Clearly the information is equally prejudicial
whether it is brought to the jury's attention innocently or maliciously,
and the result should be the same in either case. After all, the defendant
is interested, not in the good faith of plaintiff's counsel, but rather in
receiving a fair trial, and therefore if the matter is prejudicial the defendant should not be deprived of a new trial merely because opposing
6 Bauer v. Reavell, 219 Iowa 1212, 260 N. W. 39 (1935); Iroquois Furnace Co.
v. McCrea, 191 Ill .. 346, 61 N. E. 79 (1901).
7 Bergendahl v. Rabeler, 131 Neb. 538, 268 N. W. 459 (1936); Tarbutton v.
Ambriz, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 259 S. W. 259.
8 Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works, 43 Ind. App. 642, 88 N. E. 312 (1909).
9 56 A. L. R. 1418 at 1454 (1928); 74 A. L. R. 849 at 860 (1931); 95 A.
L. R. 388 at 404 (1935); 105 A. L. R. 1319 at 1330 (1936).
10 Stephens v. Clayton, 22 Tenn. App. 449, 124 S. W. (2d) 33 (1938); Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson's Admr., 157 Ky. 304, 162 S. W. II39 (1914); Ryan v.
Simeons, 209 Iowa 1090, 229 N. W. 667 (1930); Miller v. Kooker, 208 Iowa 687,
224 N. W. 46 (1929). In the Iowa cases cited it was held that where all the members
of the panel were farmers, laborers, or housewives, the possibility of interest in liability
insurance was so remote that inquiry was not necessary to protect the right to impartial jury.
11 Fulcher v. Pine Lumber Co., 191 N. C. 408, 132 S. E. 9 (1926) (good faith
indicated by plaintiff's attorney showing that he had reasonable information that
defendant was insured); Glick v. Arink, (Mo. 1932) 58 S. W. (2d) 714 (good faith
indicated by plaintiff's counsel asking defendant's counsel if he represented an insurance
company and refusal of counsel to answer); Kaiser v. Jaccard, (Mo. App. 1932) 52
S. W. (2d) 18 (good faith is presumed).
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counsel's conduct was consistent with good faith. On the other hand,
if the placing of certain information before the jury is held not to
prejudice the defendant when this is done in good faith, then the defendant is equally unprejudiced when counsel acts in bad faith, and to
grant a new trial here gives the defendant an undeserved benefit, for
by hypothesis he has had a fair trial. Also the court's time is wasted in
a useless trial, for if the objectionable matter did not prejudice the
defendant in the first trial the exclusion of this matter will not aid him
in the new trial, and the result of both trials will in all probability be
the same. If the offending counsel is to be punished, some other method
should be devised. Counsel's right to question prospective jurors regarding their connection with insurance companies, however, should be
the same whether he act!:, in good faith or bad. 12
2.

While there are strong policy arguments in favor of permitting the
mention of insurance on the 'Uoir dire examination, there are no such
arguments in favor of allowing the matter to be introduced into the
trial as part of counsel's argument to the jury, or as evidence, except
in those cases where the fact of insurance tends to throw light upon a
material issue in the cause. Assuming that the matter is clearly irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, what should be the effect when
such information does reach the jury? Again courts in many jurisdictions distinguish between cases in which the matter came in through
counsel's wilful misconduct, and those in which counsel acted in good
faith, 18 holding that the wilful bringing of the matter of insurance
12 Several solutions to this problem, attempting to protect both the rights of plaintiff and defendant, have been suggested: (a) statement by the court as to whether
there was insurance, and then a questioning of the jury as to whether this
would influence them, Fortner v. Kelly, 227 Mo. App. 933, 60 S. W. (2d)
642 (1933); (b) join insurance companies as parties defendant, thus "clearing the air"
and in time educating jurors to abandon their prejudices, 20 CoRN. L. J. 110 (1934);
(c) further suggestions made in 17 M1NN. L. REv. 299 at 312 (1933) are that (1)
court inquire of each juror as to his business relations, and ask further specific questions of those who may be interested in insurance companies; (2) court conduct a general examination of jurors as to their interest in insurance companies, first stating that
he does not know if the defendant is insured and that the jury should not consider this
possibility in deciding the case; (3) on the first day of the term court inquire of all
the members of the panel as to their interest in insurance companies and then make this
information available to the parties; (4) jurors might be asked if they have any interest
in cases of the same character as this.
13
Some courts use the term "good faith" to indicate those cases in which the
matter of insurance enters the case in connection with some material issue, Parker v.
Norton, 143 Ore. 165, 21 P. (2d) 790 (1933), and is therefore admissible. These
cases will not be discussed in this comment, which will be confined to cases in which
the matter of insurance is clearly inadmissible, and "good faith" will indicate that the
objectionable matter of insurance did not reach the jury through counsel's misconduct.
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before the jury is ground for reversal,14 but that if counsel has acted in
good faith there is no reversible error.15 A similar distinction is made in
evaluating the curative effect of the striking of the offensive matter
from the record coupled with an instruction to the jury to disregard it.
Thus a Texas court, in Austin v. Gress,1 6 said that it will be generally
presumed that the jury followed the instructions to disregard, but
where statements are made deliberately, and the party making the
improper comments has obtained the verdict, there is no way to enforce
proper practice but to reverse and remand.17
Perhaps the best example of cases wherein counsel acts in good
faith are those in which a witness gives an unresponsive and unexpected
answer containing a reference to defendant's insurance. In such cases
the defendant has almost universally been denied a new trial.18 The
courts in making this distinction between wilful and inadvertent injection of extraneous matter reason as follows: If the plaintiff's attorney
wilfully and wrongfully attempts to influence the jury, neither he nor
his client, who as the principal is responsible for his agent's misconduct,
has cause to complain if the verdict in his favor is set aside, since his
misfortune is due solely to intentional wrong. Conversely, it would be
unjust to deprive a successful party of his verdict when extraneous
matter is introduced through no fault of his own.

3.
While perhaps the numerical weight of authority is with those
courts which base defendant's right to a new trial on the bad faith of
14 Standridge v. Martin, 203 Ala. 486, 84 So. 266 (1919); Burgess v. GermanyRoy-Brown Co., 120 S. C. 285, II3 S. E. II8 (1920); Blue Bar Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Hudspeth, 25 Ariz. 287, 216 P. 246 (1923); 56 A. L. R. 1418 at 1485
(1928), speaking of the plaintiff's counsel, "if he deliberately sets out .•• to inform
the jury by improper evidence or arguments that the loss, if any, will fall upon an
insurance company, his conduct is deemed so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal of the
judgment, if for the plaintiff.•••"
15 ln Carter-Mullaly Transfer Co. v. Bustos, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 187 S. W.
396 at 398, speaking of the rule for granting a new trial when insurance is injected into
the case the court said, "we ••• will confine it strictly, when we enforce it at all, to
cases in which it is made to appear that plaintiff deliberately and persistently labored to
inject an issue not made by the pleadings in order to gain a verdict or influence the
amount of it." In Albert v. Maher Bros. Transfer Co., 215 Iowa 197 at 214, 243
N. W. 561 (1932), "Error arises ouly when a party intentionally brings before the
jury on an immaterial or irrelevant matter the fact that the opposite party carri_es
insurance."
16 City of Austin v. Gress, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 156 S. W. 535.
17 Whether or not an instruction to disregard objectionable matter ever cures
prejudice has been the subject of much dispute, but this controversy is not within the
scope of this comment, which is concerned solely with the question whether the scienter
of counsel should have any effect upon the rights of a party who has been prejudiced.
18 Meinecke v. lntermountain Transp. Co., IOI Mont. 315, 55 P. (2d) 680
(1936); 56 A. L. R. 1418 at 1451 (1928).
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opposing counsel, it is submitted that those courts which disregard the
"good faith test," and decide the question on the basis of whether or
not the wronged party received a fair trial,19 employ sounder reasoning.
According to this view, if negligence is clearly shown and the verdict
is not excessive, there is no new trial, even if plaintiff's counsel acted
wilfully; but if the case is close on the issue of negligence or if the
verdict is unreasonable, then the injection of the matter of insurance
forms the basis for a new trial.
The defendant is, after all, entitled to no more than a fair trial,
and even though the conduct of opposing counsel may be reprehensible,
if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby, he must rest on his one fair
trial and is not entitled to another. Also, where negligence is clearly
established and the verdict is not excessive, were a new trial to be
granted because of counsel's misconduct, the result in the second trial
would duplicate that in the first, and thus the courts would be burdened
with useless litigation.
Granting that offending counsel should be punished, the award of
a new trial does not seem to be the proper way to accomplish this. While
in legal theory a client is responsible for his attorney's acts, and is
therefore punishable for his wrongdoing, actually it is the attorney
rather than the client who decides how the case shall be tried, and if
a new trial is granted it is the client, not the attorney, who suffers
through delay in the collection of his claim and through added expense.
On the other hand, an inadvertent reference may be just as prejudicial to the defendant as one made wilfully. If the test for the granting of a new trial is the presence or absence of prejudice, the plaintiff
will not be reversed in cases which he would have won without the
benefit of an inadvertent reference to insurance, nor will a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff be sustained, when arrived at through prejudice,
merely because the prejudicial matter came into the case inadvertently.
In the latter case the defendant is just as innocent as the plaintiff and
hence should no more have to risk an unfavorable verdict than should
the plaintiff have to risk the setting aside of a favorable verdict.
Logically the basis for granting or denying a new trial should be
the fairness of the original trial as indicated by its result. If the proper
result has been reached there should never be a new trial, and conversely, there should always be a new trial if the result is improper.
This consideration of the fairness and result of the trial would eliminate from the scene the good or bad faith of counsel and would allow
the court to address itself completely to the real issue in the case.
Raymond H. Rapaport
19

Holloway v. Telfer, 136 Kan. 80, 12 P. (2d) 826 (1932); Parkdale Fuel
Co. v. Taylor, 26 Colo. App. 304, 144 P. u38 (1914); Daniel v. Asbill, 97 Cal.
App. 731, 276 P. 149 (1929); Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 173 Wis. 33, 180 N. W.
125 (1920); Demars v. Glen Mfg. Co., 67 N. H. 404, 40 A. 902 (1893).

